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It is critical that pilots make appropriate flight path deviation decisions when faced with threats of inclement 
weather. This research demonstrates  a latent growth model of pilots’ confidence in flight path deviation decisions 
when faced with potential weather threats. Twenty-four commercial airline pilots encountered 6 weather threats 
during a simulated flight from New York, NY to Miami, FL. Pilots made deviation decisions at 4 distance points 
from each potential weather threat. Results from the latent growth model (LGM) of pilots’ distance confidence as a 
function of the distance to the potential weather threat showed a statistically significant growth in confidence as 
pilots flew closer to the weather threat. Pilots exhibited an escalated commitment bias such that confidence in 
subsequent decisions increased more if their confidence was high in the initial decision. Weather forecasting is 




Pilots make frequent and important decisions about 
flight path deviations to avoid potential weather 
threats. There is pressure to minimize fuel 
consumption and flight time and to maximize 
passenger comfort; therefore it is important to make 
appropriate decisions about potential weather threats. 
Weather information is particularly unreliable at 
farther distances from the center of the potential 
threat. Yet pilots must quickly make appropriate 
decisions regarding deviations from the original 
flight plan. Their confidence in their initial decision 
may influence their confidence at later time points. 
Yet it is important that pilots remain unbiased and 
flexible when facing potential weather threats. For 
this study, investigators studied how confidence in 
deviation decisions changed as pilots flew closer to 
the potential weather threat. Most importantly, the 
researchers studied how confidence in an initial 
decision influenced confidence in subsequent 
decisions. 
 
Naturalistic decision making models illustrate how 
teams make meaningful decisions in complex 
environments (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 
2001). Pilots make complex decisions in demanding 
environments and these decisions have a large impact 
on the safety of passengers. This is applicable to how 
experienced aviators respond to uncertain 
information. Weather information often provides 
incomplete and unreliable information; therefore, 
pilots make decisions under uncertainty from a lack 
of information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). In such 
situations pilots may manage uncertainty by making a 
best guess with limited information, evaluating the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with 
deviating from the flight path, or ignoring uncertainty 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Naturalistic decision 
making describes how people make initial decisions 
under uncertainty, yet it fails to explain how people 
view their initial decision over time. 
 
Escalating bias refers to a decision maker viewing 
past decisions more favorably if he or she was 
initially involved in making the decision (Russ, 
2004). Most of the past research concerning 
escalation of commitment focused on monetary 
investments (Hantula & DeNicolis-Bragger, 1999; 
Lewicki, 1980), specifically the notion that people 
may inappropriately commit to failing investments 
because of their bias. This is relevant for decisions 
made across time because people’s opinions of their 
initial decision impact subsequent decisions despite 
new information. Research suggests that investors 
may commit to their initial decision even when they 
discover that their initial decision had negative 
consequences (Lewicki, 1980). 
 
There are several reasons why escalated 
commitment occurs. People’s confidence in their 
initial decision may increase over time because of 
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the notion of sunk costs (Staw, 1976). Research 
suggests that people may regard their initial 
decision more positively when they devoted 
considerable effort and time to a subsequent action 
(Garland, 1990). Therefore people are unwilling to 
suspend a project once they invested in it.  
 
Escalation of commitment is applicable to other types 
of decision making, especially when decisions are 
made under uncertainty. In aviation, pilots receive 
unreliable information about potential weather threats 
and they must decide to maintain their current flight 
path or deviate from it. Escalated commitment in this 
instance refers to a greater sense of confidence in the 
initial flight path decision as pilots approach adverse 
weather. People may experience escalated 
commitment as the action nears completion. 
Therefore, pilots would be less likely to change their 
action as they draw nearer to the weather threat 
(Boehne & Paese, 2000). 
 
The purpose of this study was to develop a latent 
growth model of pilots’ confidence of their decision 
making when faced with potential weather threats. 
The researchers hypothesized that the pilots would 
exhibit escalated commitment bias and become more 
confident in their original decision as they flew closer 
to weather threats (Boehne & Paese, 2000; Staw, 
1976). Commercial airline pilots flew from New 
York, NY to Miami, FL. During the round trip flight, 
pilots encountered six potential weather threats at 
four distance points from the center of the potential 







We used a multilevel experimental design. Flight 
crews’ team-based decision-making confidence 
constituted the dependent measure. Confidence at 
each distance level from the potential weather threat 
(i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, 20nm) was nested within 
each flight crew, which was composed of a Captain 
and a First Officer (FO).  
 
Flight crews flew a roundtrip from New York, NY to 
Miami, FL. Throughout each flight leg, flight crews 
encountered three potential weather threats, for a 
total of six potential weather threats. However, to 
increase the reliability of the dependent measure, we 
aggregated flight crews’ decision-making confidence 
across the two flight legs for a total of four data 
points, one at each distance point. 
    
Participants 
 
Twenty-four male commercial aviation and air carrier 
pilots participated in this study. We recruited pilots 
from six different airlines, including: American 
Airlines, Delta, FEDEX, Northwest, United Airlines, 
and U.S. Airways. Twelve of the pilots were Captains 
and 12 were FOs. We randomly assigned pilots to 
flight crews consisting of a Captain and an FO. 
Captains’ ages ranged from 46 to 60 years (M = 
55.33, SD = 4.01), whereas FOs’ age ranged from 34 
to 56 years (M = 46.00, SD = 6.02). Captains’ flight 
experience ranged from 10,000 to 19,000 flight hours 
(M = 13,166.67, SD = 2,910.27), whereas FOs’ flight 
experience ranged from 5,000 to 13,800 flight hours 




We presented flight crews with weather information 
regarding potential weather threats at four distance 
points from the center of the potential weather threat: 
160nm, 80nm, 40nm, and 20nm. Flight crews received 
static images of potential weather threats at each of 
these distance points through two automated systems: 
a simulated real-time Onboard weather system and a 
simulated delayed NEXRAD weather system. The 
focus of this study was to examine how flight crews’ 
decision-making confidence changed as a function of 
decreasing the distance away from potential weather 
threats. Therefore, we coded the variable distance as: -
160nm, -80, -40, -20nm from the center of the 
potential weather threat. The major reason for doing 
this was to ease the interpretation of results.  
 
Dependent Measures 
   
Decision-making confidence. Once flight crews 
received information from both the Onboard and the 
NEXRAD weather systems, they had to make team-
based decisions and answer each of four weather 
deviation questions at each distance point from the 
potential weather threat (i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, 
20m). The first question required flight crews to rate 
their confidence that a weather threat actually existed 
on a 0 to 100 continuous rating scale. The second 
question assessed flight crews’ confidence that they 
should avoid the potential weather threat and deviate 
from the predetermined flight path, also on a 0 to 100 
continuous rating scale. The third question required 
flight crews to make an ultimate decision about 
whether or not to deviate. However, for the purposes 
of maintaining experimental control, flight crews 
were not allowed to actually deviate from the 
predetermined flight path. The results from the 
previous questions were analyzed elsewhere (see 
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Bliss, Fallon, Bustamante, Bailey, & Anderson, 
2005). However, the focus of this study was the last 
question, which assessed flight crews’ confidence in 
their decision to the third question. Flight crews’ 
confidence in their decision was also measured on a 0 




Flight simulator. Flight crews completed the 
simulated round trip flight from New York to Miami 
using an EPIC AV-B/IFR™ General Aviation Flight 
Console linked to a Pentium 4 IBM-compatible 
computer running Microsoft Flight Simulator 2004. 
A rudder control module, sub panel assembly, 
external power quadrants, and avionics stacks were 
also attached to the console, which came equipped 
with a flight yoke and basic flight instruments. We 
simulated flight dynamics within Microsoft Flight 
Simulator using a Boeing 737 aircraft model. 
 
Weather Displays. The Onboard and NEXRAD 
weather displays were modeled using Visual Basic 
software and presented on a Pentium 4 IBM-
compatible computer located to the right of the flight 
console. Graphical Onboard (see Figure 1) and 
NEXRAD depictions of weather (see Figure 2) were 
periodically presented to flight crews to notify them 
of potential weather threats.  
 
 
Figure 1. Sample Onboard Weather Imagery. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample NEXRAD Weather Imagery. 
 
The Onboard system presented weather information 
from the flight crews’ point of view, and it was 
presented as the aircraft approached the weather 
threat at 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, and 20nm from the 
weather threat. The NEXRAD system presented 
weather information from a “God’s-eye” point of 
view, and it was also presented at 160nm, 80nm, 
40nm, and 20nm from the weather threat. The 
NEXRAD system updated information as it 
approached the weather threat by zooming in the 
specific waypoint, thereby providing flight crews 




After entering the experimental laboratory, pilots 
completed an informed consent form. They then 
completed a background information form to provide 
demographic information that included flight 
experience, age, and sex. After being familiarized 
with the simulator setup, pilots were randomly 
assigned to  Pilot Flying (PF) or Pilot-Not-Flying 
(PNF) roles and were given the predetermined flight 
plan. To familiarize flight crews and reduce practice 
effects, we instructed them to first fly a practice flight 
from Sacramento, CA to Los Angeles, CA. Flight 
crews were not required to take off or land, but were 
instructed to maintain an altitude of 19,000 feet, and 
an airspeed of 325nm per hour through the use of the 
autopilot.   
 
Prior to each flight leg, flight crews also received 
preflight briefing information. This information 
included the flight path and a minimal packet of 
weather information. The weather packet included 
information such as wind speed, direction, and 
convective activity along the projected flight path. 
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We informed flight crews that this information was 8 
hrs old. The usefulness of this information was 
limited by its age to ensure that flight crews would 
focus more on the weather displays. 
 
During the practice flight, flight crews encountered a 
single potential weather threat. During most of the 
flight, the weather displays did not present any 
information on the monitor. The program displayed 
weather information only at set distances from 
potential weather events. Weather events represented 
potential thunderstorms at specific waypoints that 
were considered threats to flight safety. At each 
distance point (i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, 20nm) from 
the center of the potential weather threat, the 
Onboard and NEXRAD weather displays appeared 
on the weather display monitor, as well as the four 
weather deviation questions. At this point, the PF was 
instructed to disengage the autopilot and fly the 
aircraft manually. The Captain and FO collaborated 
to complete the series of deviation questions based on 
the Onboard radar and NEXRAD information. 
Although flight crews were permitted to work 
together, they were reminded that the Captain would 
give final approval of any deviation decision that was 
reached. After reaching a decision, the simulation 
was paused to allow pilots to individually complete a 
series of questionnaires geared toward assessing each 
aviator’s individual level of trust on the Onboard and 
NEXRAD weather systems, their perceived level of 
workload, and their perceived level of situation 
awareness. Results from these measures have been 
published elsewhere (see Bustamante, Fallon, Bliss, 
Bailey, & Anderson, 2005).  
 
After completing the practice flight, flight crews 
began to fly the specified route from New York to 
Miami. During the flight, flight crews encountered 
three weather events. Graphical displays of weather 
(Onboard and NEXRAD) occurred at 160nm, 80nm, 
40nm, and 20nm away from the center of each 
potential weather threat. Each distance represented a 
decision point that required flight crews to decide 
whether and how to perform weather avoidance 
maneuvers based on the representation of weather 
provided by the Onboard and NEXRAD displays. At 
each decision point, the PF disengaged the autopilot 
and manually flew the aircraft. After deciding on a 
course of action, the simulation was briefly paused to 
allow each pilot to complete the trust, workload, and 
situation awareness questionnaires. The simulation 
was resumed after the questionnaires were completed 
and the flight crews continued along their original 
flight route. However, as previously mentioned, to 
maintain experimental control, although flight crews 
made deviation decisions, they were not permitted to 
actually deviate from the flight path.  
 
After completion of the first flight leg, the flight 
crews took a one-hour break for lunch and then 
reconvened for the second experimental flight leg. 
The Captain and FO switched roles for the return trip. 
Once flight crews completed both experimental 






Preliminary statistics showed that flight crews’ 
decision-making confidence ranged from 55.00 to 
100 (M = 90.21, SD = 9.46). Flight crews’ decision-
making confidence seemed to be normally distributed 
(Skewness = -1.18, SE = .25; Kurtosis = 1.49, SE = 
.49). Furthermore, a box-whiskers plot of mean flight 
crews’ decision-making confidence scores for each 
flight crew indicated that there were only three 
potential outliers. However, this does not raise a 
major issue of concern given that the normality 
assumption is based on the distribution of residuals of 
the final fitted model as opposed to the observed 




Flight crews’ reported decision-making confidences 
during each of the distance points (i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 
40nm, and 20nm) were nested within flight crew. 
Because of this nested nature of the data, we 
conducted a latent growth model of flight crews’ 
decision-making confidence using the hierarchical 
linear modeling program. All models were estimated 
using full maximum likelihood estimation to allow 
for comparisons of deviance tests. Models were built 
using a forward approach, starting with the random-
effects ANOVA and including set of variables based 
on whether or not they improved the overall model fit 
and were statistically significant predictors of flight 
crews’ decision-making confidence. 
 
Random-effects ANOVA. Results showed that the 
grand mean of flight crews’ decision-making 
confidence across all four distance points and all 12 
teams was significantly different from zero, π00 = 
90.21, SE = 2.06, t(11) = 43.75, p < .001. However, 
from a mathematical point of view, this test of 
statistical significance was somewhat trivial because 
although the range of the decision-making confidence 
scale (i.e., 0 – 100) included a value of zero, it is 
unlikely to obtain such a score for the grand mean. 
Nevertheless, this test of statistical significance could 
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have practical applications (discussed later). Another 
important point to note though was that results 
showed that the variance component due to 
differences between flight crews was significantly 
different from zero, τ00 = 45.65, χ2(11) =114, p < .01. 
The level-one variance component was 42.85. An 
analysis of the intraclass correlation coefficient 
revealed that approximately 51.52% of the variance 
in crews’ decision-making scores was due to 
differences between teams. Last, the deviance test 
was significantly different from zero, χ2(3) = 660/43, 
p < .001, suggesting that the random-effects ANOVA 
was not a good-fitting model for the data.  
 
Latent growth model as a function of distance to the 
potential weather threat. The next model analyzed 
was a linear growth model of flight crews’ decision-
making confidence as a function of distance to the 
potential weather threats in the presence or absence 
of display agreement. Given that we did not center 
the distance variable, in this model, π00 represented 
the expected mean value of flight crews’ decision-
making confidence at the center of the weather threat. 
Results showed that the expected grand mean of 
flight crews’ decision-making confidence at the 
center of the weather threat across all 12 teams was 
significantly different from zero, π00 = 92.08, SE = 
1.64, t(11) = 56.26, p < .001. As expected, results 
showed a statistically significant growth in flight 
crews’ confidence as they flew closer to the potential 
weather threat, π10 = .03, t(11) = 2.49, p < .05 (see 






























Figure 3. Flight-crews’ decision-making confidence. 
 
Results also indicated a high positive relationship 
between the intercepts and the slopes of the LGM, r = 
.97. Furthermore, a χ2 difference test between this 
model and the previous random-effects ANOVA was 
statistically significantly different from zero, χ2(3) = 
10.72, p < .05, which suggested that this model 




The results of our latent growth analysis showed that 
pilots’ confidence in their decisions increased as they 
flew closer to the center of the potential weather 
threat. In fact, their confidence in their subsequent 
decisions increased especially if they were initially 
highly confident at the first time point.  
 
The notion of sunk costs supports the finding that 
pilots became more confident as they approached the 
weather threat. Past research suggests that people 
regard initial decisions more favorably even in the 
presence of conflicting subsequent information 
(Garland, 1990). When deciding to either deviate 
from or maintain a current flight path,  pilots invest 
time and effort into that decision (Staw, 1976). 
Therefore they may be less willing to reverse their 
decision.   
 
This finding has important implications for aviation 
safety. Research demonstrates that people may view 
their initial decision more positively despite 
information that the original decision was 
inappropriate (Lewicki, 1980). It is crucial for pilots 
to be flexible when presented with weather threat 
information. However, greater initial feelings of 
initial confidence may lead to escalated commitment 
so that pilots become more confident in their flight 
path decision regardless of the appropriateness of 
their decision. 
 
Pilots should be trained to effectively make decisions 
by having confidence in their ability to make the 
decision rather than confidence in the decision. 
Orasanu (2005) suggests that aviation crew members 
can make more appropriate decisions if they continue 
to search for new information and reevaluate the 
situation (Orasanu, 2005). Pilots should seek more 
information and fill in missing information with their 
knowledge and experience. Therefore training pilots 
for decision making under uncertainty is crucial to 
reducing errors.  
 
Escalated commitment may have detrimental effects 
on aviation safety. Pilots’ initial decisions regarding 
potential weather threats may impact their confidence 
in subsequent decisions. This may cause pilots to be 
inflexible when presented with updated weather 
information. Therefore it is important that pilots 
remain adaptable to new information despite their 
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